Going Public: A Cautionary Tale by Lynch, Michael
Going Public: A Cautionary Tale
Author(s): Michael Lynch
Source: Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2009) 213-219.
Published by: The University of Toronto
DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v3i1.6085
E D I T O R I A L O F F I C E S
Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology
Room 316 Victoria College, 91 Charles Street West
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1K7
hapsat.society@utoronto.ca
Published online at jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/SpontaneousGenerations
ISSN 1913 0465
Founded in 2006, Spontaneous Generations is an online academic journal
published by graduate students at the Institute for the History and Philosophy
of Science and Technology, University of Toronto. There is no subscription or
membership fee. Spontaneous Generations provides immediate open access to
its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public
supports a greater global exchange of knowledge.
OPINIONS
Going Public: A Cautionary Tale∗
Michael Lynch†
A colleague who was participating in one of the many Darwin
bicentennial events on university campuses this year recently asked me,
“What was Fuller thinking?” In reply, I sent him a copy of Steve Fuller’s
(2008) opinion piece, which had just come out in this journal. In it, Fuller
attempts to explain why he decided to perform as an expert witness for
the defense in Kitzmiller et al. v. Dover Area School District (US Federal
Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2005). I doubt that his explanation
put my colleague’s question to rest.
The title of Fuller’s opinion piece “Science Studies goes Public” is
misleading. “Science studies” did not appear as an expert witness for
the defense, Steve Fuller did. As Michael Ruse (2008, 47) says in
the closing line of his review of Fuller’s book on the subject, “[a]s a
historian and philosopher of science, I can only hope that the science
community does not judge us all by Fuller’s example.” Fortunately, few
commentators have implicated “science studies” in Fuller’s testimony. It
helps that Fuller himself frequently distances himself from an imagined
orthodoxy in philosophy, history, and social studies of science, thus making
it more difficult to confuse his opinions with those in an entire academic
field. For example, in his opinion piece, in addition to lacing into Ruse and
other well-known philosophers of biology, he complains that his motives for
appearing in Kitzmiller were misconstrued by “the editorial board of Social
Studies of Science,” apparently alluding to a series of comments, including
one of his own, published in that journal (Social Studies of Science 2006).
Fuller’s opinion piece recalls a debate about “the academic as an
expert witness” (Ruse 1982, 1986; Laudan 1982; Quinn 1984), which
ran for a few years following Ruse’s testimony in McLean v. Arkansas,
∗Received May 2009.
†Michael Lynch is a Professor of Science & Technology Studies at Cornell University.
His books and articles published over the past 25 years take an ethnomethodological
approach to discourse and practical action in research laboratories, clinical case
conferences, criminal courts, and government tribunals. His book, Truth Machine: The
contentious history of DNA fingerprinting (with Simon Cole, Ruth McNally & Kathleen
Jordan; University of Chicago Press, 2008) examines the interplay between law and
science in criminal cases involving DNA evidence. He is Editor of the journal Social
Studies of Science, and President of the Society for Social Studies of Science (4S).
Spontaneous Generations 3:1 (2009) ISSN 1913-0465. University of Toronto.
Copyright 2009 by the HAPSAT Society. Some rights reserved. 213
Lynch Going Public
a landmark case in which the judge ruled against the state’s effort to
mandate the teaching of “creation science” in the biology classroom as
an alternative theory to Darwin’s. In the quarter century since then, the
context for debating the question has changed. Creation science, with
its transparent relationship to Biblical creationism, has been succeeded
by Intelligent Design (ID), which has a less obvious, and more readily
deniable, relation to religious doctrines. Unlike Ruse, who testified on
behalf of the plaintiffs and was credited with furnishing the judge with a
list of (loosely Popperian) criteria for distinguishing religion from science,
Fuller testified on behalf of the defendants. Unlike Ruse, who was treated
respectfully in the court but was later criticized by some academic
colleagues for presenting what one of his critics called “effective bad
arguments” (Quinn 1988: 398), Fuller’s particular opinions on science and
metascience did not go over very well during the trial. We could call them
“ineffective bad arguments.” The judge cited several statements of Fuller’s
out of context, in support of his ruling in favor of the other side, and some
commentators described Fuller’s performance on the witness stand as
though it provided comic relief from the more serious moments in the trial
(for example, Talbott 2005). Regardless of what Fuller may have intended
to achieve with his performance, it seems that his testimony was, at best,
ineffectual.
Given the outcome, one might expect that Fuller would admit that
he made a mistake, but far from doing so, he begins his essay by
asserting: “I believe that tenured historians, philosophers, and sociologists
of science–when presented with the opportunity–have a professional
obligation to get involved in public controversies over what should count
as science” (Fuller 2008, 11). I’m troubled by this statement, and not
because of what it expresses about Fuller, personally. Of course, he
has a right to his opinion, but this particular opinion proposes what
others of us (many of whom, as he acknowledges, do not see things
his way) are obliged to do. While I think it is fine to debate the question
of “what counts as science,” and to question those who assert publicly
that they know the answer, I see no reason to suppose that we are
obliged to perform as experts in the public controversies we study, any
more than that we are obliged to refrain from doing so. Fuller’s assertion
also presents a particular problem for those of us who hold a common,
though contested, position in science studies: that “what counts as
science” is subject to historical and situational variation and machination.
Accordingly, to study the rhetorical moves, contingent alliances, and so
forth, that establish “what counts as science” in specific historical, legal,
and educational settings doesn’t necessarily yield stable normative criteria
for distinguishing science from religion or metaphysics (Gieryn 1983, 781).
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Fuller happens to believe that it is possible to come forward with definite
meta-scientific recommendations to assist or contest legal demarcation
efforts. Having read a fair amount of what he has said on the subject (but,
by no means everything–he seems to write faster than I can read), I remain
unconvinced by his arguments–indeed, I find it difficult to locate coherent
arguments in Fuller’s writings. As his opinion piece exemplifies, he makes
frequent bold assertions and occasional insightful remarks. Sometimes
one can find the beginnings of arguments, but with astonishing rapidity
these are succeeded by poorly supported historical claims, speculations,
musings, and hostile pronouncements. For examples of the latter, take
this specimen: “When philosophers like Ruse and Pennock contribute to
this process, they effectively exchange their identities as metascientists
for underlaborers. They are traitors to their training. Nevertheless, this
intellectual treason is committed in the name of Thomas Kuhn, whose
Realpolitik of scientific change legitimized a winner-take-all approach,
whereby to gain control of a discipline’s research agenda is also to gain
control of its historical and philosophical self-understanding” (Fuller 2008,
15). Or take this chain of ad-hominem insinuations: “It is perhaps no
accident that the philosopher credited with this finding, Barbara Forrest,
is a scholar of Sidney Hook, a student of John Dewey’s who was one
of the foremost Redbaiters in the US philosophical establishment in the
1940s and ’50s, who made life miserable for the émigré logical positivists”
(Fuller 2008, 16-17). (As Fuller briefly mentions, Forrest produced textual
evidence that linked ID to creationism; evidence that the judge and many
commentators found especially persuasive.)
I suppose that such passages should not be taken seriously–that is,
they should be appreciated as provocations, or perhaps even as attempts
to entertain. Given the burden of argument that Fuller takes on, however,
they provide little basis for feeling a strong sense of obligation to follow his
heroic lead as a politically engaged intellectual. I agree that his example
is instructive: Fuller’s appearance in the Dover trial is an object lesson to
the effect that academics should think twice before subjecting themselves
to such tribunals. To be clear about this: when I say that one should “think
twice,” I do not mean that it is never advisable to present oneself as an
expert in a public forum.
Fuller accepted an invitation by the Thomas More Law Center to appear
as an expert witness in Kitzmiller ; specifically, as an expert who was
prepared to rebut the plaintiffs’ arguments about the essential nature of
science. At issue was a Dover School Board mandate to public schools in
the district to read a statement to 9th grade students in biology classes,
saying that Darwin’s theory of evolution is a “theory, not a fact” and
that ID provides an alternative theory. Given the precedent provided by
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Federal Court and Supreme Court judgments two decades earlier, a
question before the court was whether ID was akin to creation science,
which previous rulings had defined as promoting religion contrary to the
Establishment Clause of the US Constitution. In Kitzmiller, the American
Association for the Advancement of Science and other major associations
weighed in on the side of the plaintiffs, providing unequivocal statements
to the effect that ID did not enjoy the status of a science, and that it
was a disguise for, essentially, a religious doctrine. The trial raised some
interesting and problematic questions for current history, philosophy, and
social studies of science, but testifying as an expert witness for the defense
wasn’t necessarily the best way to engage with them. In addition, in
his testimony (which is available, along with supporting documents, on
the website www.talkorigins.org/faqs/dover/kitzmiller v dover.html) Fuller
delved into a whole range of substantive matters, about which he often
seemed poorly informed. His opinion piece in this journal is indicative.
In support of his meta-scientific pronouncements, he makes numerous
historical, sociological, and biological assertions about the relations
between religion and science, the plausibility of certain arguments in favor
of ID, the limited salience of neo-Darwinian theory in molecular biology,
and the “anti-Christian bigotry” promoted by proponents of the “evolution”
side of the debate. Other philosophers and historians of biology, including
some who have devoted their careers to studying Darwinian theory, the
creationist movement, and other relevant matters, have not treated his
claims kindly. Although I too have doubts about the credibility of many
of Fuller’s assertions about biology and the history of science, what I find
more incredible are the political grounds for his intervention.
Even if we accept that Fuller agreed to testify because he saw the
trial as an opportunity to conduct a metascientific tutorial in support of an
“alternative paradigm,” we still need to ask, “Did he not know?”
Did he not know with whom he would be allied? In his opinion
piece he refers to “Christians” as the hapless victims of a concerted
campaign by powerful pro-evolution forces. Aside from ignoring that such
“Christians” exclude many major Christian denominations, Fuller fails to
mention that these “Christians” are part of a large, highly organized and
active political constituency in the US that vigorously promotes a broad
socially conservative agenda. In an adversary trial in a highly polarized
situation, did Fuller actually believe that he could simply use the witness
stand to engage in an abstract discussion of “what counts as science,”
while remaining immune to the possibility that he would be aiding a political
agenda that, by all indications, he does not support?
Did he not know that, given the political stakes, his adversaries would
do all they could to discredit his testimony, attack his credibility, and make
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him seem foolish? In this case, Fuller was on the spot, not only because
he was appearing on the witness stand as an expert, but also because
he was lending academic authority to the side in the contest that was
sorely in need of it. Apparently, by his lights, he was taking a heroic stand
against the legions of academic biologists, historians, and philosophers
who lined up with the plaintiffs. Heroic or not, he was marked as one of
a very few highly credentialed academics who took the side of ID, which
concentrated the attention of his adversaries on the question of whether
he was a visionary genius or a misguided crank.
Did he not know that skeptical critique of established science and
politicization of evidence had lately become tactics wrested from their
presumed alignment with emancipatory interests (Latour 2004)? Fuller
fancies himself as a protagonist for the epistemic underdog, but what he
calls his “affirmative action” stance unwittingly recalls a rather cruel (and
in my view unfair) line voiced by Peter Slezak (2001, 14) in reference to
constructionist science studies: “affirmative action for bullshit.” His choice
to align with the proponents of ID begs the question “Why them?” when
there are so many unorthodox worldviews from which to choose.
Did he not know that, especially in the U.S. courts, questions about
“what counts as science” are handled in a way that remains largely
indifferent to the lessons from contemporary history, philosophy, and social
studies of science? One can, perhaps, criticize the courts for promoting
bad philosophy of science (Haack 2005), or one can credit them with a
more pragmatic orientation that is wary of getting entangled in arcane
philosophical disputes. Either way, it might seem that coming to the
Dover School Board’s defense was not likely to be an effective vehicle
for persuading the U.S. Federal courts to revise its operative metascience.
Did he not know that the interrogative process would draw him
into pronouncing upon topics that extended well beyond the more
circumscribed grounds of (meta)expertise he professed? And, in light of
the close attention given to such testimony by many philosophers and
historians of biology, did he not know that many of his substantive historical
and technical pronouncements would be written off as howlers?
It might be objected that such questions only seem compelling in
retrospect, but I would argue that answers to them were (or should have
been) obvious before Fuller agreed to take the stand. He could have
gained some insight into what was in store for him by reading science
studies scholarship on how courts handle expert evidence (Jasanoff 1995;
Edmond & Mercer 2002; Lynch & Cole 2005), but it shouldn’t have been
necessary to do so. The situation was not marked by subtlety, and the
political alignments were widely discussed in the press. Consequently,
Fuller’s choice (which was far from an obligation) remains baffling, though
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as I mentioned earlier his reckless intervention is instructive.
The episode should not deter further efforts by science studies scholars
to “go public,” but it should alert us to the necessity to show some wisdom
about where, when, and how we do so. It would be wise to be clear about
the sources and limits of our particular “science studies” expertise. It would
be wise to consider (even if we cannot fully know) how our opinions will
be framed and understood, and above all used, by people and organized
groups that may not share our own agendas. It would be wise to keep
in mind that the language games of a public tribunal are unlike those of
a seminar. It also would be wise not to confuse a public tribunal with a
platform for advancing our own academic interests and ambitions. And,
finally, it would be wise to keep in mind that we are not obliged to take up
any and every opportunity to “go public.”
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